Turbulent transport and production/destruction of ozone in a boundary layer over complex terrain

The first Intensive Observation Period (IOP) of the Swiss air pollution experiment POLLUMET took place in 1990 in the Aare River Valley between Bern and Zurich. During the IOP, fast response measurements of meteorological variables and ozone concentration were made within the boundary layer aboard a motorglider. In addition, mean values of meteorological variables and the concentrations of ozone and other trace species were measured using other aircraft, pilot balloons, tethersondes, and ground stations. Turbulent flux profiles of latent and sensible heat and ozone are calculated from the fast response data. Terms in the ozone mean concentration budget (time rate of change of mean concentration, horizontal advection, and flux divergence) are calculated for stationary time periods both before and after the passage of a cold front. The source/sink term is calculated as a residual in the budget, and its sign and magnitude are related to the measured concentrations of reactive trace species within the boundary layer. Relationships between concentration ratios of trace species and ozone concentration are determined in order to understand the influence of complex terrain on the processes that produce and destroy ozone

A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing

Vertical integration and firm boundaries : the evidence

Since Ronald H. Coase's (1937) seminal paper, a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input–output structures. In the last twenty-five years, empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating. We review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions: First, what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and, second, what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices, quantities, investment, and profits. Throughout, we highlight areas of potential cross-fertilization and promising areas for future work

Industry concentration and strategic trade policy in successive oligopoly

We study a policy game between exporting and importing countries in vertically linked industries. In a successive international Cournot oligopoly, we analyse incentives for using tax instruments strategically to shift rents vertically, between exporting and importing countries, and horizontally, between exporting countries. We show that the equilibrium outcome depends crucially on the relative degree of competitiveness in the upstream and downstream parts of the industry. With respect to national welfare, a more competitive upstream industry may benefit an exporting (upstream) country and harm an importing (downstream) country. On the other hand, a more competitive downstream industry may harm exporting countries.Financial support from the Norwegian Research Council, through the PETROPOL research programme, is gratefully acknowledged. The paper has been greatly improved by the suggestions of two anonymous referees. We also thank Hisashi Hokari and Frode Meland for valuable comments and suggestions

WHO BENEFITS FROM CORRODING KEIRETSU?

Observations on Japan's industrial distribution system reveal that many producers maintain both keiretsu and non-keiretsu channels. An intriguing question then is: what economic rationale underlies such an ambivalent policy? This motivated us to present a model of an incomplete keiretsu system. We find that the collapse of a keiretsu is not necessarily a misfortune for the firms remaining therein: they can turn the situation to their advantage if a keiretsu collapses partially. We show why some firms leave their keiretsu while others remain with it, and determine who the winners are. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

The promise and pitfalls of restructuring network industries

This paper examines the competitive effects of reorganizing a network industry's vertical structure. In this industry, an upstream monopolist operates a network used as an input to produce horizontally differentiated final products that are imperfect substitutes. Three potential pitfalls of restructuring integrated network industries are analyzed: (i) double marginalization, (ii) underinvestment and (iii) vertical foreclosure. The paper studies the net effect of restructuring on retail prices and cost-reducing investment and discusses policy implications